Both Barranquilla and Cartagena had new local governments that were just beginning to be active in the IUC programme in January Shortly thereafter, once the cities had prepared for their first study visits with their European peers, the COVID pandemic hit Europe, leading all study visits to be cancelled.
Despite not being able to meet their European partners in-person, both pairings began cooperating diligently through online webinars and meetings. Barranquilla is implementing urban gardens as a tool to drive social integration, guided by Velletri and Rome, who lead an URBACT European transfer network on this topic.
Both of these cases have been successful thanks to commitment, involvement, and proven dedication from all participating cities, and have included stakeholders in the co-design and co-implementation of pilots. It is thus no surprise that the cities are hoping to continue working together in the new IURC programme , and to visit each other in-person. This series sought to seize the enormous challenge of facing the pandemic as an opportunity for exchange.
Although IUC pairings demonstrated resilience when travel was unexpectedly halted, study visits are nonetheless a preferred tool for city-to-city cooperation. Meeting in person helps create friendships that guarantee long-lasting cooperation. Comparisons with the American Marshall Plan of may be useful. John Maynard Keynes believed that the shortcomings of the Versailles conference in stemmed from among other things a flawed understanding of international economic relations that he had tried and failed to correct.
In combination, the Marshall Plan and the policy of containment became the twin linchpins of US hegemony Keohane, , ; Ruggie, ; Patrick, That hegemony involved providing international public goods, promoting the European Organization for Economic Cooperation as a new multilateral institution, and applying the logic of power politics to the bipolar confrontation between the US and the USSR.
Assuming that China is not seeking to use the BRI to pursue international hegemony, it will need to expand the nature of its international public goods provision, offer its autonomous partners opportunities for economic growth, enhance its soft power dimension, and foster shared interregional leadership within a revived multilateral network in order to limit the impact of negative feedback and foil policies of containment by the US and other actors.
The quality of its partnership with the EU and possible convergences both at the global and interregional levels are crucial. These are the key variables that may influence this potentially virtuous interregional scenario. Here, a triangular partnership among China, the EU, and Africa would be a relevant test. Traditionally, trade was a matter of technocratic, de-politicized global or interregional relations.
However, this is changing dramatically, as a comparison of Chinese and EU approaches to foreign policy makes clear. Of course, future post-hegemonic multilateralism will have to be based on pluralist convergence among very diverse approaches, political styles, background cultures, and divergent ways of making policy.
Ignoring this principle slowed progress in expanding multilateral trading relations. When interregional dialogue misses a two-way exchange, a negative feed-back is to be expected by the junior partner. Are these ambitious objectives realistic? These complex and multipurpose interregional partnerships are politically relevant, notably in the Asia-Pacific region, because they address the huge vacuum created by the inward-looking and protectionist policy of Donald Trump.
Although arrangements about foreign investments were located in the sphere of EU competence by the Lisbon Treaty, this competence was fine-tuned by the European Court of Justice in For that reason, the difficulties involving several ongoing negotiations, including the Bilateral Investment Treaty with China, are understandable.
Is China likely to agree to seek some relevant improvements in respect for the rule of law in general and labor law in particular? Transparency and fairness in business are the conditions for attracting foreign investments, increasing trade, building financial and economic partnerships.
Consequently, they are among the goals of President Xi Jinping, as announced at the party congress of However, many problems exist that touch on the domestic impact of multilateral standards. In addition, the question of labor rights is affecting the BIT agenda. Doing so would not be easy, first because of the Lisbon Treaty provision that has altered the process through which trade policy acquires legitimacy.
The treaty calls for enhanced democratic accountability and transparency by bestowing an oversight role on the EU parliament. Moreover, that body has the final word on ratification and carries on a constant dialogue with very persistent NGOs.
The Lisbon Treaty thus has changed the parameters and now requires closer cooperation among the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament.
In effect, it integrates the Parliament into the established decision-making system. They have chosen to submit treaties to national and even sub-national in the case of Belgium majority decision-making.
Legitimacy is very relevant a true priority. However, according to many observers, that complex internal ratification procedure may undermine the credibility of the EU in international and interregional negotiations. Or should the new system be considered, if not an example to be followed by partners, a constructive factor, fostering higher standards in commercial arrangements, as it did in several instances, notably in the cases of Canada, Mexico, MERCOSUR, Japan, and Asia-Pacific?
It is too early to answer this crucial comparative research question. However, in a context of increasing competition with alternative authoritarian models, the bottom-up, democratic and multilateral type cannot progress without a substantial political upgrading, and without seriously while gradually addressing the respective background cultures and their profound differences. To cite just one case in which the background culture has an enormous impact on politics, we spent a part of this essay in considering the case of EU relations with China.
Despite their internal debates, eminent Chinese scholars do agree on this, including Qin , Yan and Zhao , all of whom have argued eloquently for the continuing relevance of Confucianism in China see for example the April conference at CFAU University, Beijing for the current approaches to international and interregional relations. Turning to the European Union, we would encounter broad agreement that, at least on the continent and excluding the UK, the Enlightenment tradition and the value of peaceful reconciliation between previous enemies still matter a great deal in supporting the integration process and open interregional relations.
These should be topics for multidisciplinary research programs including political science, economics, law, philosophy, history and geography. In any case, it is a matter of fact that the territorial and transnational dimension of the world polity plays a crucial role in sustaining interregionalism in several ways, notably by making it more efficient, legitimate, and able to frame balanced dialogue among cultures.
Memory also matters: thinkers such as Habermas , and Bobbio , among others, have made it clear that this cathartic feature of European political culture marked a radical turning point against centuries of tragic conflicts and wars provoked by extreme nationalism during the first decades of the 20th century, the most violent period in European history.
In the very moment at which movements have arisen that revive the pre nationalist specter, it is important to underline this feature of the European political background culture, one that is the very soul of European reconciliation and is open to intercultural dialogue. Peaceful interregional transnationalism based on internal reconciliation is not the identity marker emerging from European societies 75 years after it has lasted as a critical factor in promoting peace though socio-economic integration and governance beyond the state.
As a consequence of the financial crisis that began in , nationalism has returned in the form of populism, protectionism, and intolerance. It poses a threat not only to domestic democracy but also to interregional and multilateral cooperation. What is new is that the populist rhetoric deploys democracy as a rhetorical weapon against three targets: openness, European integration, and interregional relations with other continents, notably with Africa, South America, East Asia and China.
Partner cultures exist in each continent as potential ideational constructive factors. We already mentioned the potentials of the Confucian culture. This innovative way forward might lead to several confidence-building processes, trust-building dialogues, while gradually allowing governance beyond the state to be transformed from an instrumental into a binding process supporting common struggles for common global goods.
This gradual revision of the traditional Westphalian paradigm towards a multilayered, post-hegemonic multilateral governance is very controversial, but, to some extent, already underway. Acharya A. Allison G. Bergsten F. Bhagwati J. Bobbio N. De Block C. Ding C. Bridging ideational and institutional difference, Abingdon, UK, Routledge. Economy E. Fawcett L. Fitriani E. Fukuyama F.
Engagement with the latter groups has significantly increased in the past three decades, as part of the 'new regionalism' agenda, which carries with it a strong component of external region-to-region engagement, introducing new dynamics to international relations. Besides trade, diplomacy and economic cooperation, the promotion of regional integration initiatives in other areas of the world is among the most important external policies through which EU directly or indirectly attempts to increase its soft power SMITH, ; LENZ, Such a focus on regionalization is not a mere projection of the EU's experience, but it is viewed as a key goal to reform international relations.
For instance, Fawcett and Hurrell maintain that the logic of interregional cooperation, that is the way in which the EU carries out its relations with other regions or groups of states, derives from the success of the European model, which has transformed relations between formerly warring parties into a cooperative structure where divergent interests converge through negotiation and commonly agreed upon institutions.
The first years of MERCOSUR coincided with a gradual shift in Brazilian foreign policy towards the region: while previously Brazil had put very little effort in promoting the idea of complex interdependence in the region, in the post Cold-War era regionalism became increasingly more important for the Brazilian foreign policy agenda, reaching its peak during the Lula governments between and SPEKTOR, At the level of political discourse, this shift implied a rather enthusiastic endorsement of the European international pro-ject as the key reference point for South American integration, largely based on the former economic, political and social achievements LENZ, As the undisputed leader in regional initiatives, due largely to its economic size and power, Brazil has often looked to Europe in its discursive construction of an institutional project for its region.
In this regard, not only would MERCOSUR need more integration internally, but it would also need to look strategically at the rest of the world to seal new partnerships, including in Africa and the Middle East.
It is important to recognize that the most successful processes of integration existing today had as their primary foundation the strengthening of their legal framework and institutions. The European Union experience proves the importance of seeking to harmonize the set of rules of the member states relating to the integration process at the regional level AMORIM, a.
Yet, due to the inability of MERCOSUR's member states to agree on issues of proportionality and representation, there has been significant delay in making this new institution operational. Also this sequence followed in the footsteps of the EU, which linguistically moved from being a Community to becoming a Union in with the objective of underlining a deeper degree of integration.
UNASUR incorporates 12 member states and aims, among other things, to collectively address cultural, social, economic and political issues, including social policies, energy, infrastructure, environment, the reduction of inequalities and the promotion of peace, and democracy.
Similarly to the EU, it is institutionally equipped with sectoral ministerial councils to address special areas such as drug trafficking, defense, development, infrastructure and energy. Another important institution for further regional integration that has enjoyed significant Brazilian support has been the Latin American Bank for Regional Development, which is strongly influenced by Jacques Delors' policies for cohesion and regional development, and is reminiscent of the European Central Bank.
In nearly eight years of President Lula's tenure, Brazil has invested in a new concept of regional integration. A concept that, without disregarding the economic and commercial aspects, seeks to incorporate the political, social and cultural dimensions and, most importantly, a strong sense of solidarity AMORIM, , p.
Even here, of course, the EU's model is clearly providing the background, not only with the evolution that eventually led to the direct election of the European Parliament in , the institution of the Ombudsman and the popular initiative legislation, but especially with the debate over the Constitutional Convention of Although these general concerns are common to any polity, it is only after a certain level of integration that they begin to emerge.
In this regard, it is clear that Amorim and Lula's government have been thinking of the future projections of MERCOSUR along the lines of the step-by-step process outlined in the introduction, whereby a common market should evolve into some type of economic and political union.
In terms of external relations, particularly regarding the engagement of MERCOSUR with the wider international community, the government's discourse appears to be influenced by the EU's strategies of interregionalism, engagement with the developing world, democracy promotion and special relationships with the neighbourhood.
Brazil has been supporting the conclusion of negotiations on services with Colombia, investments with Chile and the deepening of the MERCOSUR-Peru agreement, while at the same time proposing more favorable trade terms for certain Bolivian products, such as textiles.
It also emphasizes the need for support, and aid for peace-building and reconstruction in those of the 'sister countries' which are going through difficult times, such as Haiti. Both these elements are reminiscent of the EU's policy in the Mediterranean, previously illustrated in initiatives such as the European Neighborhood Policy.
Venezuela's controversial full membership has been pending since and was only completed in , while Bolivia is in the process of becoming a full member since December Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru have only been granted associate status.
About the difficulties in South American integration, such as free circulation among countries [ We are trying to grow fast, but evidently [we] do not have, yet, almost fifty years of existence.
So, [ Speaking about the creation of UNASUR on national radio, Lula himself addressed preoccupations about internal differences among the South American states by referring to the fact that the European states too often disagreed about important matters, such as Iraq, the constitution and the monetary union. The next section reflects on whether the EU model is still viewed as viable and attractive to Brazil after the breakout of the Euro-crisis and the resulting internal disputes.
Although the turn of the millennium ushered the EU into a consolidation phase, it also revealed more or less hidden weaknesses and, on various occasions, posed several challenges to the deepening of the integration process.
Legitimacy and effectiveness crises hit the European Communities and then the EU several times during its life. In , the proposed Constitution was rejected by the French and Dutch referenda. Finally, since and more prominently since , the EU's common currency, the Euro, has been under attack due to the risk of sovereign debt default by some member states hit by the global economic crisis.
Talks of potential disintegration of the Union, or at least of the Eurozone, have abounded, and solidarity within the EU has reached unprecedented lows. The explosion of the financial crisis in Europe led to high levels of unemployment, a drop in structural growth and excessive levels of sovereign debt. Moreover, an ageing population and increasing dependence on resources have aggravated the crisis.
Since the crisis hit member states unevenly, with some countries faring rather well and others sinking into a protracted recession, the implications for the stability and solidarity of the integration process were inevitable.
In less than two years, the gap between donors and recipients within the EU grew, bringing with it pessimistic forecasts about the future of regional integration and a lack of support for the EU in many member states. With the EU emerging as one of the most hard-hit casualties of the financial crisis and with intra-EU inequalities reaching unprecedented peaks, new doubts were raised as to the capacity of Europe to provide leadership in a fundamentally changed international order.
As maintained by the Prime Minister of Turkey, one of the so-called emerging economies along with other powerhouses such as China, India and Brazil, 'the financial crisis has laid bare Europe's need for greater dynamism and change':. European labor markets and social-security systems are comatose. European economies are stagnant. European societies are near geriatric.
Can Europe retain power and credibility in the new world order [ At the same time, this development began to cast a shadow over the alleged success of an economic and political union without a central government, over the real state of the widely heralded 'solidarity' principle at the basis of the EU integration experiment and, overall, about the actual benefits of European integration for its citizenry 2 2 Author's interview with Loukas Tsoukalis, Athens, January 6th, By contrast, just like most emerging powers, Brazil got over the financial crisis quite quickly and with relatively minor shocks.
The recession only hit the Latin American country for five months in , largely due to the panic triggered by the financial mar-kets. In the Ibovespa index hit the ground slightly below the points, creating losses worth billions for major Brazilian companies like Sadia and Votorantim. In response, the Brazilian Central Bank injected millions of dollars into the market; unlike the US and Europe, however, no bail out for national companies was needed.
The government decided to temporarily suspend the tax on industrial products in the hope of keeping the Brazilian consumers in the game and helping the automobile industry. With these measures in place and having registered 61 months of continuous growth until the crisis hit, Brazil managed to achieve an average of growth rate over 3. Due to its relatively low interdependence with the rest of the world, the whole of Latin America emerged relatively unscathed from the crisis.
Thus, while Europe's downward spiral continued, particularly after the Greek debt crisis, Latin America slowly but steadily gained credibility in international economy. Brazilian policy makers and opinion leaders have interpreted the EU crisis as further evidence of the power shift and global transformations occurring in the 21st century. In its most classical formulation, these changes affect the global economy and give birth to a new international arena in which emerging economies such as Brazil become the new poles of power.
This idea has been one of the cornerstones of Lula's foreign policy, as illustrated by the following excerpt from a speech delivered at the G20 Finance Ministers' meeting in Sao Paulo:. We need to enhance the participation of developing countries in the decision mechanisms of the global economy. The emergence of Brazil and other new player as economic power houses of the 21 st century is therefore associated with the need to reform global governance.
In this context, the crisis is viewed as an opportunity to fast-forward necessary reforms. In a interview, Minister of Finance, Guido Mantega stated:. The European crisis did not get in the way [of the reform of multilateral organizations], quite the contrary. The European crisis puts forward the need of continuing the reforms and measures that were established. We need new governance, one more open to participation.
Brazil is ready to take on its responsibility. This is not the time for narrow nationalisms [or] for individual solutions. It is the time for a pact between governments to create a new global finance architecture, capable of promoting safety and development on an equal basis for all [ Although the redistribution of political and economic weight in global affairs preceded the fall of Wall Street and the Euro-crisis, these latter have accelerated the need for a new direction: 'in so far as the crisis appeared in the centre of capitalism, big developing countries have become, in a way, guarantors of the world's stability.
The official discourse revolves around the fact that 'this time, the emerging countries have helped to re-establish balance in the developed countries. Quite importantly, this shift has its epicenter in Europe, where the sovereign debt crisis has revealed a reversed trend: it is now for Brazil to help Greece 'get out of its crisis' AMORIM, Interestingly, also the evolution of regional cooperation and integration is affected by the global power shift.
According to the former president,. While Brazil is increasingly viewed as a forward-looking rising star, Europe is perceived as facing deep challenges that could jeopardize its position in the world economy. At least in the economic realm, the Brazilian model seems to have surpassed the EU model.
Lula himself referred to this dynamics:. Brazil was one of the last countries to be hit by the crisis and one of the first to recover from it. Because we had reorganized the economy along solid foundations, based on growth, stability, productivity, on a healthy financial system, on the access to credit and on social inclusion. In short, it is plausible to conclude that the crisis has helped Brazilian policy makers underline the power shifts and global transformations empowering the Latin American region and weakening traditionally dominant players, particularly Europe.
The crisis is thus portrayed as a factual confirmation of the 'era of Brazil' rhetoric, as captured in an interview Lula gave to the Spanish daily El Mundo in I am convinced that the 21 st century is the century of Brazil.
We are living an exceptional moment. Although the overall discourse depicts a rapidly changing world in which Brazil and the Latin American region become more influential and traditional powers such as Europe lose leadership, Brazil and the EU are still described as important partners e. Within the new global context, however, Brazil fe-els entitled to turn things around and give lessons to Europe, following Amorim's remark that 'the European Union is now seeking Brazil's partnership', rather than the other way around PAIVA, The major Brazilian daily, Folha de S.
The idea that Europe must learn from Brazil, which to an extent reverses previous patterns of thinking, is welcomed with an underlying sense of achievement and pride, as illustrated in an op-ed by prominent journalist Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr.
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